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ABSTRACT 
Although a plethora of research has examined the benefits of government support for state-
owned enterprises, our understanding of how domestic support can become a source of 
liability is severely limited. In this paper, we develop a novel concept of “liability of 
domestic support” to articulate how government support for state-owned firms can create 
conditions for business failure to occur. Analyses of the cases of Air Afrique, Nigeria 
Airways and Ghana Airways led to the identification of factors which helped to create the 
conditions that allowed inefficiencies, mediocrity and incompetence inherent in state-owned 
organisations to thrive, which ultimately led to their demises. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few decades, scholars have demonstrated that government policies and supports 
can foster innovation, help new firms to overcome liability of newness and provide 
conditions for local firms to thrive (Chu, 2011; Edquist, 2011). It has also been demonstrated 
that such supports can provide the basis for local firms’ competitive advantage (Petersen and 
Pedersen, 2002). However, scholars have remained relatively silent on how government 
support for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) can become a source of liability and even lead to 
such firms’ failure (Doganis, 2006). This dearth of scholarly work is puzzling given that such 
research has the potential to enrich our understanding of government policies, processes and 
factors that lead to business failure.  
Although past studies have offered an array of rich explanations of the causes of 
organisational failure (Knott and Posen, 2005), this issue has been largely overlooked. Our 
purpose in this study is to fill this gap in our understanding by examining how state policy to 
support state-owned and local firms can become a source of liability precipitating in such 
firms’ failure. In developing our arguments, we advance a novel concept of “liability of 
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domestic support” to elucidate the mechanisms through which state support can become a 
liability and precipitate the demise of SOEs.  
To further shed light on our concept and the unanswered question, we examine a tale of three 
failed major airlines, i.e., Air Afrique (AA), Nigeria Airways (NA) and Ghana Airways (GA) 
over relatively short periods. These once-mighty airlines were owned by more than 12 
countries and their histories are intertwined in the colonial history of the whole of sub-Sahara 
Africa. By employing these historical cases, we further enrich the ongoing scholarly 
discourse of the need to bring “history” back into international business, industrial and 
government policy literature (Jones and Khanna, 2006). The rest of the paper is organised as 
follows. The next section articulates the key features of our concept of “liability of domestic 
support”. We then illustrate the theoretical analysis with the cases of AA, NA and GA. The 
paper concludes by setting out the implications of the findings for theory and practice.  
THE “LIABILITY OF DOMESTIC SUPPORT”: A CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
The study integrates insights from the concepts of Icarus Paradox (Miller, 1990) and “liability 
of foreignness” (Hymer, 1960; Zaheer, 1995) to help clarify the boundaries of the concept of 
“liability of domestic support”. We contend that, by seeking to provide competitive 
advantages to SOEs through special measures such as subsidies, special privileges, 
preferential treatment and tax relief, governments unwittingly create conditions that allow 
inefficiencies, mediocrity and incompetence inherent in SOEs to thrive. Interestingly enough, 
the protection and privileges inherent in government supports, which sometimes 
discriminated against foreign and other firms, can often fool SOEs into believing that their 
past routines, processes and strategies which brought about success, would guide them to 
future success even in the face of a changing competitive landscape.  
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Another notable feature is that SOEs are able to enjoy government subsidies and institutional 
support such as state aid, soft loans made on less than normal commercial terms, tax relief, 
debt forgiveness, discounts on charges for services, discounts on or exemptions from 
navigation and landing fees, privilege in the supply of fuel and debt forgiveness (see 
Amankwah-Amoah, 2010; Doganis, 2006). Indeed, government support has the potential to 
put off the need for reforms to improve efficiency and allow inefficacy to thrive (Doganis, 
2006). Consequently, as the competitive landscape changes through market reforms and new 
competition, it becomes increasingly difficult for such firms to maintain the status quo and 
sustain their competitive advantages and thereby precipitate their demise.  
Another line of research has suggested that such preferential treatments and special privileges 
often lull SOEs into a false sense of security or robustness of their sources of competitive 
advantage and thereby become less attentive to changes in the external environment (Amason 
and Mooney, 2008; Miller, 1990). Because of such supports, the organisations may 
“gradually slide so far out of touch with what is happening… that a potentially fatal disaster 
develops unseen” (Hedberg et al., 1976: 50). Such overconfidence rooted in the protections 
from the state can cause managers to delay or ignore rival firms’ activities in their 
environment.  
This line of thinking is similar to the notion of Icarus Paradox concept (Miller, 1990), where 
past successes or supports seduce managers into a failing course of action, which ultimately 
led to the firm’s demise. Past successes breed over-confidence such that managers begin to 
ignore the alternatives and the success becomes the imprint for the future even though the 
environmental conditions might have changed. The inability to take advantage of such special 
treatment to develop new sources of competitive advantage and improve processes can 
become liabilities in the face of a changing competitive environment (Amason and Mooney 
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2008). The unwillingness to deviate from the dogma and rituals eventually precipitates the 
firm’s demise.  
Government actions to provide protection and subsidies to help local firms might create 
conditions where they become over-confident about themselves and overlook their limited 
expertise. Indeed, such protection and preferential treatment may create conditions that foster 
inefficiencies, mediocrity and incompetence inherent in SOEs, which may ultimately 
precipitate the failure of the business (Amankwah-Amoah and Debrah, 2010).  
The different treatments between insiders (SOEs) and outsiders (foreign firms or privately-
owned firms) put outsiders firms at a competitive disadvantage relative to local firms (Miller 
and Richards, 2002; Miller and Parkhe, 2002). However, foreign and privately-owned firms 
not party to such treatment can overcome some of the constraints in the business environment 
through resource commitment to understand the market. They can also  develop new sources 
of competitive advantage such as superior customer services, cheaper services, quality 
products and acquiring market knowledge (Zaheer, 1995).  
Government actions through discriminatory laws, rules and regulations may be overcome by 
developing superior attributes of an organisation called competences or capabilities 
(Wernerfelt, 1984). As firms learn about the new market, the associated costs of doing 
business abroad falls over a period of time as they get acquainted with the new business 
environment (Nachum, 2003). Although effective management of foreign and privately-
owned firms can make a significant difference in overcoming their liabilities (Petersen and 
Pedersen, 2002), it is extremely difficult for such firms to overcome government 
discriminatory actions to protect and aid SOEs (Nachum, 2003).  
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Although domestic firms are generally better informed about their country and its business 
environment (Hymer, 1976), the discriminatory and preferential treatments can become a 
sources of liability as they expand into new foreign markets. We contend that supports 
offered by governments in form of subsidies and tax relief can help new firms to find their 
feet in competitive industries. However, it can also create conditions for complacency, 
mediocrity and incompetence and inefficiency to flourish which ultimately precipitate 
business failure.  
The above discussion indicates that there are two main component of “liability of domestic 
support”: level of support (high/low) and level of protection (high/low). Crossing the two 
dimensions produces the 2x2 conceptual framework of the subject (See Figure 1). Although 
the importance of the domestic government support has fostered a steady stream of research, 
our understanding of the concept and how it can precipitate the failure of SOEs remains 
limited. We illustrate our theoretical analysis with the cases of the three state-owned airlines.  
Figure 1: A four-cell typology of “liability of domestic support”  
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A TALE OF THREE FAILED AIRLINES 
It was against this backdrop in the 1950s and 1960s that the “three Darlings” (i.e. NA, AA 
and GA) were established. Indeed, “legend has it that when African states gained their 
political independence from Western countries, they were bequeathed three seemingly 
essential symbols of sovereignty – a national flag, a national anthem and a national airline” 
(Fadugba, 1991: nd). For decades, the governments took measures such as providing aid and 
subsidies to prevent the collapse of their symbolic firms. These airlines shared a number of 
characteristics and were considered the flag bearers of the “New Africa”. Of their many 
similarities, such as being state-owned and recipients of government assistance for decades, 
there were repeated attempted to privatise by the nations. Despite that, decades have passed 
since the end of colonial rule and the lessons stemming from their formation and subsequent 
demise have not been learnt. Their collapse provides a background to the comparative 
analysis. Table 1 provides the background history of the three firms.  Before we proceed to 
the cases, let us provide a historical backdrop of the industry. 
Table 1: Features of the three state-owned airlines 
Firms Found
ed 
Dominant logic at 
founding conditions 
Exit Exiting conditions 
Ghana Airways 1958  Political support 
following 
independence in 
1957. 
2004  Dwindling circle of financial backers.  
 State involvement, over reliance on 
states’ limited resources, global 
competition. 
Air Afrique- 
formed by 11 
Francophone 
countries in Africa 
1961  The firms focused 
fulfilling the political 
objectives of the 
founders. 
 
2002  Conflicting interests of contracting 
states, appalling service and over-
employment, global competition. 
 Debt-ridden and corporate 
dysfunction. 
Nigeria Airways 1958  Strong political 
support 
2003  State involvement, over reliance on 
state’s limited resources, global 
competition etc. 
 Cognitively constrained by decades 
of state subsidies which discouraged 
large scale staff reductions. 
Sources: synthesized by the authors from: African Development Bank 1999; Akpoghomeh 1999; Amankwah-
Amoah and Debrah 2010, 2011, 2014; Brooke 1987, 1988; Tsamenyi et al. 2011; Flight International 1960, 
1961, 1962; 1988, World Bank 1998, 2003. 
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GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS AND THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY IN AFRICA 
Historically, the global airline industry has been governed through the system of bilateral air 
services agreements, which are effectively trade agreements between governments (Doganis, 
2006). Since the late 1970s, when the United States initiated the deregulation of its domestic 
freight and passenger markets, there has been a shift towards global liberalisation of air 
transportation markets (Button, 2002). In the face of increasing force of liberalisation in the 
US and elsewhere, African governments were forced to explore ways to help improve the 
competitiveness of African airlines. It was at the Yamoussoukro Convention on Market 
Access for Air Transport in Africa in 1988, where governments adopted the Yamoussoukro 
Declaration (YD) as Africa’s blueprint for liberalisation (Amankwah-Amoah and Debrah, 
2011). The adoption of the YD as Africa’s blueprint to liberalisation ushered in a new era of 
competitive environment by seeking to remove all restrictions in intra-Africa routes by 
allowing free access of air traffic between member states in order to create a single African 
aviation market (UNECA, 1999).  
African countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and founders of AA took initiatives to open their 
markets to regional and international competition. By the end of the 1990s witnessed a little 
progress towards the implementation of the famous declaration but many state-owned airlines 
became increasing resistant to the idea of opening the African market to major carriers from 
the developed economies that could drive them out of business. Whilst the YD had not being 
fully implemented at this stage, the adoption of YD served as a catalyst and laid the 
foundations for countries to begin to open their markets to regional competition. In the 
industry, liability is likely to manifest through bilateral restrictions on market access, 
designations and frequency that have allowed nationality clauses to emerge which puts 
foreign-owned airlines at a competitive disadvantage. In the case of Africa, the YD explicitly 
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insists on states to designate an airline(s), which to some extent comes with a degree of 
nationality rules.  
One of the main differences for foreign-owned and local or domestic airlines is the area of 
designation. Designation involves each country nominating one, two or more than two 
carriers, to operate any agreed international route(s) (Chang and Williams, 2001). This 
element helps in determining how many players there are in the market. In other words, it 
often limits the number of flights per foreign-owned airlines on a route which intentionally 
protects domestic or national carriers from fierce competition. For instance, the YD allows 
any airline, which has “its headquarters, central administration and principal place of business 
physically located in the state concerned” to benefit fully from the advantages set forth 
(UNECA, 1999).  
The requirement of states to designate an airline(s) in bilateral arrangements encouraged 
governments to set up or maintain an operation of an airline irrespective of their traffic 
potential (Doganis, 2006). This is partly because nationality clauses and ownership rules “lie 
at the heart of bilaterals and without them the value of the agreements is questionable” 
(Baker, 2002: 26). This has provided grounds for bilaterals to be constructed in favour of 
domestic/local airlines or one owned by nationals. Since bilateral agreements are effectively 
“trade agreements between governments, not between airlines” (Doganis, 2006, p.28), they 
are often guided by strong political and national interest considerations. States guard the 
granting of traffic rights, and most rights issued by these treaties were based upon reciprocity.  
In recent years, there has been a shift from single to multiple designations of airlines in most 
bilaterals (Knibb, 2007). This has eased restrictions on many airlines. The bilateral system is 
underpinned by the ownership rules, which limits foreigners to a minority stake. Indeed, most 
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countries limit foreign ownership and control through bilateral agreements, which require 
airlines to be owned and controlled by nationals of the designating state (Knibb, 2007). This 
means that airlines are restricted from utilising alliances and mergers to consolidate their 
operations and achieve economies of scale. This anomaly has benefited airlines in operating 
in large domestic markets and regions such as the US and EU. Restrictions on ownership 
have dissuaded individuals and financial institutions from investing in airlines in other 
countries since it barred foreigners from exercising any effective controls on the management 
of the airlines. Consequently, there are little incentives for foreign investors to commit 
substantial resources into an airline.  
Case 1: Ghana Airways (1958–2004) 
Following decades of struggle and a concerted effort spearheaded by the United Gold Coast 
Convention and others to gain independence from the colonial master, Great Britain, in 1957. 
Ghana, under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, decided that a national airline not 
controlled by former colonial powers would allow the country to take its rightful place in the 
world. Ghana Airways was formed following the disintegration of West African Airways 
Corporation (WAAC) which was a jointly owned airline operated by four nations, namely 
the Gold Coast (now Ghana), Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gambia (Amankwah-Amoah, 
2010).  
In 1958, this culminated in the formation of GA with national backing to train the indigenous 
population to manage and control the affairs of the airline. For President Nkrumah who 
desired minimal foreign influence in the affairs of the nation, the new national airline was the 
major starting point in “flying the flag” of a newly independent nation and a symbol of the 
emerging post-colonial Africa. In an editorial, Flight International (1962: 926) noted, “GA 
have never made any secret of the fact that prestige comes first, economic considerations 
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second.” These principles guided successive governments with unquenched thirst to protect 
the airline and maintain its operations through special privileges and access to abundant 
national resources.  
Although the airline was formed with British Overseas Airways 
Corporation (BOAC) Associated companies holding 40%  (£400, 000 nominal capital), as 
part of the agreement at founding, 12 of the BOAC staff were seconded to GA which 
included the general manager, station manager, accountants, reservations and sales 
superintendent, and engineer (Flight International, 1961). One of the motives was to make a 
quick transition to moderate “Ghanaisation” of the airline and the economy. The 
“Ghanaisation” was aimed at diminishing the influence of former colonial powers in the 
affairs of the nation and thereby allowing the nation to find its feet in the post-colonial 
Africa.  
However, this quickly turned into an extreme “Ghanaisation” process which extended beyond 
the airline industry into nationalisation of foreign-owned firms and the extending powers of 
the state. Consequently, the link with BOAC Associated quickly became an obstacle to 
Nkrumah’s ambitious projects of “Ghanaisation” of the airline and the wider society and 
industries (Flight International, 1961). The agreement which was signed between the two 
airlines was revised in July 1958 to pave the way for Nkrumah to take full control and pursue 
his nationalistic goals. Earning the reputation as Osagyefo (the Redeemer) enabled the 
president to push ahead with these agendas with little social resistance.  
Case 2: Nigeria Airways (1958–2003) 
Following Ghana’s exit from WAAC, the Nigerian government established NA and it started 
operations in 1958. The formation paved the way for the airline to take over some of the 
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services previously operated by the WAAC (Flight International, 1969). By the late 1960s, 
most of the airline’s route networks extended beyond Africa to European cities such as 
London, Rome and Frankfurt.  
By March 1961, the Government held 51% of the shares and then acquired the 161% of the 
shares from BOAC and 36% from Elder Dempster (Flight International, 1969). 
Unsurprisingly, the acquisition of the stake of the two shareholders was followed by intense 
state involvement in the direction and processes adopted by the airline.  
By the mid-1960s, the fortunes of the airline had turned dramatically. Indeed, a tribunal of 
inquiry into the affairs of the airline initiated by the Nigerian Federal Military Government, 
uncovered factors such as incompetent management, lack of financial control, 
mismanagement of funds, inappropriate payment to unknown individuals and organisations, 
and corruption as major factors in turning the profitable period from 1961–62 into a loss of 
over £500,000 between 1963–64 (Flight International, 1969b).  
For decades the firm prospered under a regime of government subsidies to fund new routes 
and special tax regimes; it enjoyed the patronage of being a national airline and had a 
historical advantage over its rivals. Nevertheless, poor customer satisfaction records and the 
experience of firms dealing with them, appears to have undermined its ability to sustain long-
term operations. One of the sources of the airline’s problems was the two decades of military 
rule and quest to use it as the main national symbol of independence. The military rule led to 
asset stripping and revenues were diverted to private accounts of key individuals within the 
military rule. In many instances, planes were impounded at numerous airports due to unpaid 
bills and the poor safety track record of the airline. Following years of unresolved financial 
and political issues, the firm ceased operation in 2003. 
 13 
From Nigeria Airways to “Nigeria Air Waste” 
This period was marked by a further shift from the founding principles to a new environment 
where corruption and mismanagement became major features of the airline. In 1984, the 
United States Civil Aeronautics Board threatened to impound NA aircraft found bringing 
drugs into their country. The events damaged the image of the airline, making it difficult to 
attract and retain customers which forced the management to introduce new measures to 
identify and punish staff involved in and assisting trafficking of drugs to the US or any other 
country (Fadugba, 1985a).  
“Our national airline is a disgrace. Lateness, delays, outright cancellation of flights and a 
nonchalant attitude of the staff toward customers are now part of your operational guide” 
Nigeria's Minister of Transport and Aviation, Brig. Jerry Useni, told airline employees in 
early April 1987 (Cited in Brooke, 1987). 
In 1985, the company underwent sweeping administrative reorganisation in an attempt to 
arrest the shrinking resource base, and address the debt-ridden and corporate dysfunction 
which had allowed corruption and mismanagement to thrive. The strategy adopted at this 
point entailed reduction in staff numbers (including the sacking or retiring of more than 1,000 
of the 10,000 workforce from January 1984 to April 1985) and to tighten up on malpractice 
and misallocation of the firm’s resources to line the pockets of some individuals (Fadugba, 
1985a, b). This was exemplified by the fact that in 1984, the airline’s net revenue on its key 
European routes was N4.5 million Naira (£4.4 million pounds sterling) – a decline of around 
21.6 per cent on 1983 data (Fadugba, 1985a).  
In identifying the causes of the decline, scapegoating by the management was very evident 
and they attributed the sharp declined to the then Military Government’s austerity measures 
which partly contributed to a 52.8% fall in passenger traffic on the key London route in 1984 
(Fadugba, 1985a; see also Figure 2 ). However, they ignored the fact that liberalisation of the 
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air transport market was gathering momentum in Africa and many customers switched to 
rival airlines due to the poor customer services offered by the airline. In addition to these, the 
strategy also sought to discontinue servicing of unprofitable routes, close some subsidiary 
offices around the world, eliminate excessive overseas travel by employees and their relatives 
paid from the airline’s account, and reduce wet-leased aircraft.  
At this point in the firm’s history, these expenses had become not only major obstacles to 
progress, but had created an environment where anything goes. It is against these backdrops 
that the airlines came to be known as "Nigeria Air Waste". As far back as the late 1980s, the 
airline was dubbed “Nigeria Air Waste” and “Nigeria Errways” to reflect the rampant waste 
of the state’s limited resources, inefficiencies and looting by political appointees who ran the 
firm (Brooke, 1987).  
High-level fraud among workers and management became very common. This took root with 
the emergence of military regimes which turned a blind eye to the corruption. Indeed, in 
many instances they were actually involved in the act. Between 1983 and 1999 more than 
US$400m (£254m) disappeared from the airline’s account without trace. The company's 
abysmal record keeping and bad debts led to a decline in the number of fleets (BBC, 2002). 
In the late 1980s, Airbus A310s were among the most efficient aircraft at the time and many 
airlines were eager to acquire them.  
However, in 1987, the Nigerian Transport and Aviation Minister, Major General Jerry Useni, 
declared that the airline was going to discontinue the use of Airbuses arguing that the aircraft 
were “too technologically advanced” for the local engineers (Flight International, 1987). This 
was surprising given that additional training would have equipped the engineers to pave the 
way for the airline to use efficient planes at the time relative to the alternatives. 
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The growth of the airline and it’s increasingly appeal to travellers meant that, by 1986, it 
carried 2.1 million passengers to at least 22 international destinations and 16 domestic routes 
(Brooke 1987). At this point, the airline was seen as a symbol of black Africa's largest 
passenger carrier. In addition, some of the airline's employees were implicated in 
international drug trafficking, while others were seen selling boarding passes for $200 apiece. 
“For every plane owned by the company, there are 500 employees, or about twice the 
international average. Yet domestic air fares, set by the Government, average 6 cents a mile – 
half the international average – and international fares are also kept artificially low. As a 
result, the airline is chronically short of cash and is the only carrier in the 125-member 
clearinghouse of the IATA that has been suspended for not paying debts” (Brooke, 1987: 3). 
By mid-1987, the poor customer service coupled with employees’ counterproductive 
behaviour such as trading boarding passes for cash, and general corruption prompted many 
commentators to call for privatisation of the airline (Brooke 1987; Tsamenyi et al., 2011). 
This argument was further reinforced by the fact that the Government of General Ibrahim 
Babangida had imposed stringent austerity measures on the country to reduce its $20 billion 
foreign debt.  
In addition, the government opposed any attempt to increase “international air fares 
originating in its two international airports, in Lagos and Kano. Hence, a Lagos–London–
Lagos first-class ticket costs $1,114 if it is purchased in Lagos, but $3,203 if bought in 
London” (Brooke, 1987: 3). Consequently, the air fares were considerably lower than those 
charged in other African and Western airlines for flights that covered a similar distance. 
Indeed, “a one-way economy ticket to London or Paris – about 3,000 miles – costs $337. The 
same ticket for a flight from Abidjan, Ivory Coast, to London or Paris – also about 3,000 
miles – costs $762” (Brooke, 1987: 3). 
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Furthermore, it was not uncommon for both reservations and scheduled flights to be 
“ignored” by the airline (Brooke, 1987; Akpoghomeh, 1999). Such was the poor quality of 
service offered by the airline, even government workers, who were required to use the airline 
on overseas trips, often opted for other African and foreign airlines (Brooke, 1987). In 1993, 
economic progress in the country came to a halt when the military leader General Sani 
Abacha came to power, suspending privatisation and commercialisation of SOEs by a 
military decree (Tsamenyi et al., 2011). Indeed, the general’s spending approach meant that 
the government was extremely reluctant to release any money for maintenance and other 
operational activities of the airline. The airline was able to sustain losses as well as sustain 
operations largely because of the support of the government to plug gaps in its finances.  
In 1995, the government sacked the entire top management team of the airline in an attempt 
to pave the way for fresh and innovative thinking to emerge (Endres, 1995). However, the 
major constraints on the airline’s operations such as political interference and continuous 
flow of financial resources to the firm appeared to have made managers complacent to pursue 
any large-scale measures to improve efficiency. Historically, the government misidentified 
the causes of the airline’s problems and the prescribed inappropriate solution. Despite 
frequent changes in the management team, the underlying problems remained for decades. At 
this point, it was clear that the protracted problems such as flight delays, corruption and 
mismanagement and looting had led to the loss of most fleets and international credibility 
(Endres, 1995).  
Although both NA and GA emerged out of WAAC, there are similarities in their post-
colonial trajectory and eventual collapse. Following decades of sub-standard performances, 
NA was liquidated in 2003 which was followed in 2004 with the collapse of GA. Tsamenyi et 
al. (2011: 3) noted that both airlines had deep-rooted “political interference, poor 
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accountability and mismanagement, inefficiency, saddled with excessive debt and eventual 
liquidation”.  
Case 3: Air Afrique (1961– 2002) 
Although the creation of AA was not the first major attempt to establish a multi-flag world 
airline, it remains the most significant in post-colonial African history. The airline was 
formed in 1962 by 11 African countries with the support of France and Air France. It was the 
first major attempt by African countries to establish an airline which served the interests of 
multiple states. AA was a quintessential Pan-African airline, in which multiple countries held 
a stake. The sheer political weight and financial resources of the founding countries behind 
the airline provided the enabling environment for the firm to achieve global success as well 
as the ability to overcome the financial constraints that had served as an obstacle to other 
countries in establishing a global airline. Its strength lay in having more than 11 countries as 
owners, providing a wider pool of talent and resources to draw from.  
Founder countries’ expectation was that it would become not only Africa’s largest airline, but 
also one of the biggest in the globe. This to some extent was fulfilled during the heydays. 
However, the complex organisational structure became a source of confusion and periods of 
indecision (Amankwah-Amoah and Debrah, 2014). One of the problems encountered by all 
three firms was their inability to shake off their reputation of poor quality service once the 
reputation was acquired. This hampered numerous attempts to revitalise the airline due to low 
customer demands.  
CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
Having identified the features of each firm, we now present the cross-case analysis. We tease 
out some the factors that led to the failure of GA, AA and NA. 
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National patriotism and patriotic purchasing 
Consumer ethnocentrism played a major role in perpetuating mediocre services offered by the 
airlines and ensuring their survival for decades. Klein (2002: 346) defined consumer 
ethnocentrism as “the belief that it is inappropriate, or even immoral, to purchase foreign 
products because to do so is damaging to the domestic economy, costs domestic jobs, and is 
unpatriotic.” For decades, the main marketing messages for AA and GA were to appeal to 
Africans in the diaspora that it was unpatriotic, harmful to the domestic economy or may 
even bring back colonial rule if they fail to fly with local airlines. For instance, GA 
vehemently pursued is “Ghanaisation” strategy which appealed to local businessmen and 
women to only fly with the airline, whilst NA quickly pursued its “decolonisation” strategy. 
The airlines made implicit use of national colours in packaging or labelling. These strategies 
were pursued to retain consumer loyalty and boost sales of the local airlines. Africa’s past 
history of colonialism left many Africans, during the immediate post-colonial period, 
developing a negative attitude towards some of their colonial powers and firms connected to 
them. In many instances, national affiliation was so strong that it superseded affordable and 
reliable services offered by rival airlines.  
Patriotism was seen as a commitment and sacrifice to help protect the local economy and 
jobs. Against this backdrop, many consumers were willing to pay higher prices to contribute 
to their country and local economy. Despite decades had passed since colonial rule, patriotic 
Africans strongly opted for their national airline over a foreign airline (ARB, 2008). Indeed, 
many corrupt leaders have often invoked such sentiments to exempt themselves from any 
blame over their bad policies.  
However, these strategies also made the airlines unattractive to Western and North American 
travellers as well as consumers around the globe who sought quality services and affordable 
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prices over national patriotism. For decades, the airlines could count on patriotic consumers. 
Discriminatory actions by consumers against foreign-owned airlines bred complacence and 
overconfidence among the top management teams of the firms. As liberalisation advanced in 
the late 1980s and 1990s, more local and international airlines emerged. It therefore became 
increasingly difficult for them to attract consumers due to the historical poor services offered 
by the airlines, characterised by long delays. They began to lose market share to private and 
foreign airlines which were able to offer competitive rates to consumers.  
To illustrate this point further, we turn again to the case of NA. As new firms such as ADC 
(established in 1984), Concord Airlines (1986), Express Airways (1986), African Trans Air 
(1992) and Bellview Airlines (1992) emerged, it became increasingly difficult for the firm to 
attract new customers and it also started losing customers to these rival firms (Akpoghomeh 
1999). Consequently, the competitive pressure on both domestic and international routes 
squeezed the revenue streams of the firm and precipitated a terminal decline.  
Figure 2: Domestic passenger traffic between Nigeria Airways and other airlines  
 
Sources: Akpoghomeh, 1999; Federal Office of Statistics, 1996 
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Figure 2 provides details of the evolution of NA domestic passenger traffic and how it shrunk 
from 1985 to 1995, whilst at the same time the market share of autonomous carriers surged  
715,000- 1,756,000.  More importantly, the private airlines were able to overcome historical 
advantages of the SOEs to attract customers. On the other hand, multinational carriers such as 
British Airways and Air France have historically operated services across Africa and possess 
significant knowledge of the business environment. On intercontinental routes where the 
African carriers competed against European and American carriers, the number of customers 
began to dwindle, which led to loss of market share.  
Figure 3: International passenger traffic between Nigeria Airways and other airlines  
 
Sources: Akpoghomeh, 1999; Federal Office of Statistics, 1995, 1996 
As new routes were opened up to allow more privately owned and non-African airlines to 
expand on its key routes to Europe, head-to-head competition advanced as other Middle East 
airlines also utilised their hub-and-spoke network to expand their geographical routes and 
compete indirectly with the airline. Consequently, their sources of revenue were further 
squeezed culminating in loss of market share and shrinking customer base. It is worth noting 
that in the case of NA, the traffic decline on international routes as not as sharp as those 
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experienced on domestic routes (see Figure 3). In the post-9/11 environment, it became 
increasingly difficult for them to make up for the loss in market share whilst sustaining the 
decades of losses. AA exited from the industry in 2001 followed years later by the other 
airlines. 
The dominant European airlines in Africa 
Since the early 1980s, African countries increasingly signed favourable bilateral 
arrangements with European countries and thereby provided the conditions for major 
European airlines to open new routes across the continent. Given the poor quality of services 
that had been historically offered to African consumers by the three airlines, the emergence 
of more European airlines provided the travellers opportunities to switch. It also enabled the 
consumers to switch from traditional airlines such as GA and AA with historical track record 
of overbooking (Amankwah-Amoah and Debrah, 2014). In addition, several African airlines, 
including the three airlines, were noted for their poor safety records. In the case of AA, its 
passenger numbers declined as French airlines such as Air France saw significant growth in 
the market share which eventually sealed the fate of the firm.  
Fadugba (1991: nd) identified the following symptoms associated with most African airlines 
at the time, they were “handicapped by their small size, obsolete equipment, inadequate 
capital, insufficient traffic, weak national economy, strong international competition, lack of 
autonomy and transient management. Separately, they lack the critical mass needed to benefit 
from economies of scale and to compete effectively in the tough international airline 
industry”.  
Under these circumstances, no firm can afford to be oblivious to the needs of all of its 
customers. However, the protection inherent in state ownership and fringe benefits made the 
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airlines oblivious to changing consumer trends and often ignored numerous customers’ 
complaints about poor quality in-flight and off-flight services. Despite the shift in the global 
airline industry towards privatisation of SOAs in the 1980s, many African governments 
considered their flag carriers as a source of pride that needs to be protected (ARB, 2008). Due 
to their close cultural and national association, some countries, including Ghana and the 
owners of AA, saw privatising the unprofitable state-owned airlines as politically unwise and 
opted to maintain the current status quo. 
By developing distinctive features such as reputation for quality, reliable services, excellent 
safety record and extensive route networks, European airlines such as British Airways, KLM 
and Air France operating in Africa at the time were able to overcome the lack of local 
government support. By competing against EU and US carriers in Africa, excellent safety 
records that are associated with these carriers become a key selling point. The advantages 
associated with nationality appear to be minimal in the African airlines as many are largely 
uncompetitive and dwindling in numbers (Amankwah-Amoah and Debrah, 2011). By the 
1990s, Fadugba (1990) observed that European airlines dwarfed African airlines on Europe– 
Africa routes and thereby weakened the competitive positions of African carriers in an era of 
global competition. This issue did not go away rather it accelerated and played a fundamental 
role in the demise of the three airlines.  
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This study set out to examine how government supports can become a source of liability in 
precipitating failures of SOEs. In so doing, the article develops that concept of “liability of 
domestic support” to illustrate how government support can create conditions for 
complacency and inefficiency to flourish and thereby precipitate the demise of SOEs. We 
illustrate our theoretical analysis with the cases of the “three darlings” (i.e. AA, NA and GA) 
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and demonstrated how governments policies and supports created the conditions that led to 
their demises. The study uncovered that special measures such as subsidies, special 
privileges, preferential treatment and tax relief created conditions that allowed inefficiencies, 
mediocrity and incompetence inherent in SOEs to thrive, which eventually contributed to the 
demise of the business.  
More importantly, protection and privileges breed over-confidence and inattentiveness in the 
face of changes in the environment, which pushed back necessary reforms in the face of 
increasing competition and the emergence of new firms. In addition, the firms 
“indigenisation” approaches such as “Africanisation” (at AA), “Ghanaisation” (at GA) and 
“de-colonialisation process” (at NA) made it difficult for them to attract foreign travellers to 
offset decline in their local consumer base, which contributed to their demise. 
Contributions to theory and practice 
The study makes two main contributions to the literature. First, it develops the concept of 
“liability of domestic support” to demonstrate how government actions allowed SOEs to be 
lulled into a false sense of security or robustness of their sources of competitive advantage, 
which ultimately led to their demise. By charting the evolution and eventual demise of the 
three firms, our study adds to scholarly works that have argued that business failure may be 
best understood as a historical phases which entails the evolution of factors, interaction of 
firm-specific and external factors, firm response to early-warning signals of decline and 
eventual demise. In so doing, we further contribute to ongoing efforts to develop a theory of 
business failure pathways (Moulton et al., 1996) which take into consideration the evolution 
and interactions of firm-specific factors and general changes in the external environment. In 
addition, the study builds on Sutton’s (1987) process of organisational death by introducing 
how governments actions through policy formulation and directives can either slow or 
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accelerate the process of organisational death, thereby, providing further insights into why 
some organisations die more quickly than others.  
From the public policy standpoint, firms can accumulate superior resources and capabilities 
to outwit their competitors to offset such liabilities and, in the process, precipitate the demise 
of rivals. By deploying these organisational strengths and cultivating inter-organisational 
relationships, firms would be able to circumvent regulatory constraints in their operating 
environments. The findings indicate that governments should seek to create a level playing 
field where competition flourishes and allow inefficient firms to fail rather than been propped 
up by limited financial resources of the state. A fertile area for future research would be to 
seek a wider sample of firms to determine whether our findings are borne out in other 
contexts. In closing, we hope that the paper serves as a catalyst for more research on how 
“liability of domestic support” precipitates business failure.  
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